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Abstract
Using a unique data set on organized crime, we examine for the first time the interplay
between domestic and foreign criminal organizations in Italy. We find that cooperation
between Italian and foreign organizations is strongly associated to activities in which
foreign organizations are well placed to supply inputs. Interestingly, this association is
stronger in regions home to the headquarters of traditional Italian organizations (incum-
bent regions). To mitigate reverse causality concerns, we use a Propensity Score approach.
Once these are taken into account, we find that cooperation is higher when crimes are
undertaken in incumbent regions and are such that foreign organizations can more easily
supply inputs. Using a simple coalitional model we rationalize our results showing that
they are consistent with an economic motive coupled with the threat of violence involved
in criminal activities.
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1 Introduction
Since Becker (1968) the economic analysis of crime has mostly focused on the behavior of individual
offenders.1 Much less attention has been devoted to the activities of criminal organizations, especially
from an empirical point of view. However, an increasing number of recent empirical works has looked
at the causes and the consequences organized crime. For example, Dell (2015) has shown how law
enforcement can trigger drug-trade-related violence in Mexico. Bandiera (2003), Dimico et al. (2012)
and Buonanno et al. (2015) have instead traced the origins of the Sicilian Mafia from the demand of
enforcement and protection.2 Others, like Pinotti (2015) and Geys and Daniele (2015) have studied
how the presence of organized crime can negatively affect the quality of politicians.3
An important and often neglected issue in the literature on economics of crime is that criminal
organizations are in many respects comparable to corporations. Organizations like the Japanese
Yakuza or the Italian ’Ndrangheta are in fact large groups of people involved in complex activities
(e.g. drug production, human trafficking, money laundering, etc...). Like corporations, they exploit
networks, increasingly structure themselves like “conglomerates of crimes” and cooperate with other
groups (Robinson, 2000; Sterling, 1994; Williams, 1994).
Interestingly, this trend also characterizes Italy, a country that is historically known for the
presence of strong local (incumbent) organizations (i.e. the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in
Campania and the ’Ndrangheta in Calabria), that is increasingly attractive also for foreign groups.
In the words of the Italian National Anti-Mafia Attorney:
“...We are used to think of our criminal associations acting in Italy and abroad... But
now the reality is partially changed. Next to this phenomenon another equally dangerous
reality is also emerging: the presence of foreign organizations operating in our territory,
with or without relations with our traditional mafia.”4
In this paper, we examine cooperation among different criminal organizations, showing that their
behavior is shaped by the type of crimes committed and by the strength of local groups in some
regions. While plenty of anecdotal evidence is available on the subject, to the best of our knowledge
this is the first study to investigate the issue systematically, using a newly collected data set that
allows to look at the behavior of local and foreign organizations in the Italian territory. Data contains
information on the investigations conducted, between 2007 and 2010, by the Direzione Investigativa
Antimafia (DIA), the Italian anti-mafia agency in charge of monitoring the activities of criminal
organizations.
We find that local and foreign groups are more likely to cooperate for specific crimes (e.g. human
trafficking and enslavement activities). Moreover, the presence of traditional (incumbent) organi-
zations in some regions reduces the probability of cooperating. However, in these areas the same
1See Dills et al. (2010), and Ehrlich (2010) for a review of the literature.
2From a theoretical point of view criminal organizations have been shown to influence the way laws are optimally
enforced (e.g. Backhaus, 1979; Buchanan, 1973).
3Kugler et al. (2005) shows theoretically that the presence of organized crime negatively affects the accountability
of the political class.
4Report of the Italian National Anti-Mafia Attorney, December 2012.
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probability is higher when cooperation takes place for criminal activities in which foreign organiza-
tions can play an important role in providing inputs (e.g. for counterfeiting activities). One possible
explanation could indeed be that in regions where incumbents are strong, foreigners might be forced
to cooperate in criminal activities they could normally engage in without a local partner. We ra-
tionalize our results with a model suggesting that cooperation is not only driven by an economic
motive, but also by the threat of violence involved in criminal activities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates the context in which the DIA was
established. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 present the results. Section 5 presents a simple
theoretical model which rationalizes our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The DIA
The Cosa Nostra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Camorra (we will also call these ”traditional organi-
zations”) have been operating in Italy at least as far as the country’s unification in 1861 (Lupo,
2011). However, it was only in the 80’s that Italian laws really acknowledged the peculiarities of
“large-scale” organized crime. In response to the expansion of organized crime and to the related
escalation of violence that characterized the 1970s and 1980s (especially in Sicily and in Campania),
a body of new laws was put in place. In this context, in 1991, a new agency, the DIA, was created as
a monofunctional investigative body, composed of specialists in various police corps, with the task
of conducting criminal investigations relating exclusively to crimes of criminal associations (art. 3 of
Decree 345 - 1991 and art. 108 of Legislative Decree no. 159 - 2011).5
Importantly, in conducting investigations, the DIA focuses on criminals rather than individual
crimes. As a rule, it does not act on the basis of a notitia criminis, i.e. a notice conveyed to a
prosecutor that a crime is alleged to have occurred: criminal phenomena are analyzed through the lens
of criminal associations, with the aim of identifying their individual components, responsibilities, roles
and attitudes. In particular, the DIA systematically monitors criminal associations and individuals
suspected of belonging to mafia organizations. Investigations are coordinated by a prosecution judge
(the Pubblico Ministero) until sufficient elements are available for him to be authorized by another
judge to issue warrants against alleged members of criminal organizations. If warrants are authorized,
the police will execute them.
3 Data
Twice a year, the DIA illustrates its activities to the Italian Parliament. In these occasions, a detailed
summary of the investigations is made available in reports that the DIA publishes on its website.
These reports constitute our main source of data.
5The idea of having an agency with the only task of conducting investigations on organized crime was especially put
forward by the the judges Falcone and Borsellino, both murdered by the Sicilian Mafia, shortly after the establishment
of the DIA, in 1992.
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To perform the analysis, we collected information about all the incarceration orders (we will also
call them police actions) which, between 2007 and 2010, took place following DIA investigations
leading to arrest warrants of alleged criminals accused of having committed one ore more crimes.6
3.1 Actions
Per each police action, the DIA reports the offense(s), whether the offenders belonging to the caught
organizations were Italians or foreigners (or both), where crimes were allegedly undertaken and the
number of people involved (accused). Figure F1 in the Appendix provides an idea of the typical
set of information reported by the DIA per each action. Collecting data from DIA files has at least
two advantages. First, it allows us to focus on the activities of criminal organizations rather than
on the offenses undertaken by individual criminals. Second, we observe when domestic and foreign
organizations are caught together, i.e. we observe when they cooperate and for which criminal
activity. To the best of our knowledge, the latter feature is unique to our data set.
Over the time span covered in this paper, 1,861 police actions took place following DIA investi-
gations. Each of them led to the imprisonment of alleged criminals accused of having committed one
or more crimes. Table 3.1 lists the number of actions in each year of the sample at hand: in 2007
this number is smaller than in the other 3 years.7
Table 3.1: Number of Police Actions, by Year
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Actions 308 532 492 538 1,861
% 16.47 28.45 26.31 28.77 100
Source: Authors’ elaborations on DIA reports.
3.2 Cooperation
In taking the action i, the police may incur in criminals belonging to three types of organizations:
those composed of Italians or foreigners only (Domestic and Foreign) and the mixed ones, i.e. those
made by Italians and foreigners (Cooperation). Figure 1 shows the number of actions taken against
each type of organization: the bulk of them (70.12%) concerns domestic organizations. However,
around 30% of the actions are taken to fight organizations composed by foreigners only (17.03%)
or by Italians and foreigners (12.85%), showing a non-negligible involvement of foreign groups in
organized crime activities in the Italian territory.
6Unfortunately, DIA reports do not provide any information concerning the unsuccessful investigations, i.e. those
that did not lead to arrests. Moreover, While data before 2007 could also be collected, the way DIA reports are
compiled makes the combination of pre-2007 and 2007-onwards data inappropriate. Finally, we exclude arrests of
fugitives for which warrants were issued in the context of other investigations and those of individuals caught in the
act of committing a crime outside an ongoing investigation.
7The smaller number of actions reported in 2007 is not related to a different way of reporting the DIA activities.
Moreover, excluding 2007 actions from the sample does not change the results discussed in the next sections
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Figure 1: Type of Organization
Note: The figure shows the number of actions taken by the police during 2007-2010. It distinguishes between actions taken against
organizations composed of Italians or foreigners only (Domestic and Foreign) and those constituted by Italians and foreigners (Cooperation).
To study cooperation between Italian and foreign organizations we define the dependent variable,
Cijt, as a dummy equal to 1 if in taking the action i, the police arrests members of an organization of
Italians and foreigners, in province j, at time t. Descriptive statistics for the variable Cijt, reflecting
the numbers shown in Figure 1, are reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Cijt 0.129 0.335 0 1 1,861
Inpijt 0.114 0.318 0 1 1,861
Incr 0.482 0.5 0 1 1,861
Incr,[HQ only] 0.363 0.481 0 1 1,861
Incr,[HQ and outside] 0.089 0.285 0 1 1,861
GDPjt 9.815 0.301 9.384 10.605 1,861
Permitsjt -4.195 0.779 -5.816 -2.141 1,861
Densityjt 12.053 1.633 5.511 14.775 1,861∑N
i=1 P
ijt 11.5 15.967 1 173 1,795∑N
i=1 O
ijt 1.788 1.234 1 14 1,861
3.3 Criminal Activities
Each police action follows an arrest warrant issued against alleged criminal accused to have under-
taken one or more crimes.8 Figure 2 shows the occurrence of the different types of criminal activities,
from the most (Drugs) to the least frequent (Smuggling).
8Table A1 in the Appendix shows summary statistics per each criminal activity.
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Figure 2: Police Actions, by Crime
Note: The figure shows the ratio between number of actions taken by the police against a given crime and the
total number of actions, for the period 2007-2010. White Collar includes Mafia Association, Bid Rigging, Unfair
Competition, Fraud, and Money Laundering. For detailed definitions of those crimes, please see Table A1 in the
Appendix.
Figure 3 shows instead the distribution of those crimes across the three types of organizations
illustrated in the previous subsection. An interesting fact emerges: foreigners, both when caught
alone or in cooperation with Italians, seem to specialize in specific crimes, like prostitution and
counterfeiting activities, human trafficking, enslavement practices, and smuggling (dashed bars in
Figure 3). This suggests that foreign organizations are more likely to be involved in criminal activities
where could be well placed to provide certain inputs. For example, in the case of prostitution and
enslavement activities, or human trafficking, foreign organizations could procure people more easily
in their, often distressed, countries of origin.
The DIA has indeed underlined how foreign organization tend to wangle people with the promise
of a better life if they migrate (DIA, 2010). However, once in Italy, these people are often exploited,
enslaved, and blackmailed by criminals who can threaten immigrants’ relatives in their home coun-
tries. Foreign organizations (especially Chinese ones) are also active in counterfeiting markets where
they are likely to have a competitive advantage in importing illegal product to be sold in cooperation
with local organizations (notable examples of this type of activities are the agreements among Chi-
nese groups and the Neapolitan Camorra). In this sense, foreign organizations are possibly better
placed than local ones to supply inputs for criminal activities, i.e. people to be exploited or illegal
goods to be sold at very competitive prices. The same types of activities are likely to be more costly
for Italian organizations.
Figure 3: Type of Organization - Number of Police Actions (by Crime)
Note: The figure shows the number of actions taken by the police during 2007-2010, by criminal activity. It distinguishes among actions taken against
organizations composed of Italians or foreigners only (Domestic and Foreign) and those made by Italians and foreigners (Cooperation). White Collar
includes Mafia Association, Bid Rigging, Unfair Competition, Fraud, and Money Laundering. For detailed definitions of those crimes, please see Table
A1 in the Appendix.
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3.3.1 Inputs
To capture the fact that foreigners are more involved in some crimes than in others, we classify as
inputs those crimes for which the share of police actions in which foreigners were caught are more
than half of the total amount of actions taken for the same crime, between 2007 and 2010, that is:
Inpijt =
1 if
N∑
i=1
O i,F
[
N∑
i=1
O i,All
]−1
> 1
2
0 otherwise.
(1)
where (Oi,F ) Oi,All indicates the offense(s) of which alleged (foreign) criminals were accused in the
context of action i in province j at time t. In other words, a criminal activity is classified as input if
foreigners are responsible for more than half of it, i.e. if the number of times foreigners are caught
to commit a given crime is above the median. Table 3.2 shows that inputs concern 11.4% of the
police actions. With this criterion Prostitution, Human Trafficking, Enslavement, Counterfeit, Cyber
Crimes and Smuggling are classified as inputs.
3.4 Incumbent Regions
As mentioned earlier, Italy is home to some of the oldest criminal organizations in the World. In
particular, the presence of the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in Campania and the ’Ndrangheta
in Calabria dates back at least to the second half of the XIX century. These organizations have
traditionally exerted the monopoly of violence and a pervasive control of the territory, both through
criminal activities and influence on local institutions (see e.g. Pinotti, 2015). It is thus hard to
imagine that foreign criminal organizations undertake criminal activities, in those regions, without
interacting with traditional ones.
In this sense, Calabria, Campania and Sicily are different from other Italian regions, i.e. they
are characterized by the presence of incumbents. The peculiarity of these three regions also emerges
from our data: 83% of the actions taken there by the police in incumbent regions target traditional
organizations, confirming their strong presence in those markets. To capture this peculiarity, we
define incumbency in two ways, as described in Figure 4. First, by constructing the dummy Incr
which is equal to 1 if crimes are allegedly undertaken in at least one of the incumbent regions (i.e.
Calabria, Campania and Sicily). The subscript r indicates that these are region-level variables.
Second, by distinguishing between actions targeting criminals exclusively in incumbent regions and
those which concern both incumbent and non-incumbent regions. In the former (latter) case, the
variable Incr,[HQ only] (Incr,[HQ and outside]) will be equal 1. Table 3.2 shows that almost half of the
actions target incumbent regions (45%). Of these around 75% concern incumbent regions only, while
25% target alleged criminals in at least two regions, of which one is incumbent.
We will adopt Incr as the main variable to capture incumbency in our analysis. However, in
Section 4, we will instead use Incr,[HQ only] and Incr,[HQ and outside] to show that whether crimes are
committed solely in headquarter regions impacts the behavior of criminal organizations, i.e. it has
an effect of the probability of cooperating.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the Incumbency variables
(a) Incr = 1
Incr,[HQ only] = 1
Incr,[HQ and outside] = 0
(b) Incr = 1
Incr,[HQ only] = 0
Incr,[HQ and outside] = 1
3.5 Additional Variables
Our data also contain information on the number of persons targeted by the police actions. To
exclude that cooperation is purely driven by the larger amount of people needed to perform a given
criminal activity, in each regression, we control for the by-action number people reached by the arrest
warrants (
∑N
i=1 P
ijt, where P stands for persons, i indexes the action, j the province and t time).
At the same time, cooperation could also be determined by the number of crimes to be committed.
To control for this, we always include the number of crimes at the action level (
∑N
i=1O
ijt, where O
stands for offense, i indexes the action, j the province and t time. Table 3.2 shows that the average
number of persons (crimes) per police action is 11.5 (less than 2).
The literature on economics of crime has shown that economic and demographic factors are
important determinants of crime.9 To account for these factors, in some specifications, we will
include the GDP and two demographic controls. GDPjt is real GDP per capita in province j in year
t. Permitsjt are residence permits over the total province j ’s population at time t, as of December
31 of each year. Densityjt is the population density in province j at time t.
10
4 Cooperation, Inputs, and Headquarter Regions
In the previous sections, we presented descriptive evidence that mixed organizations seem to spe-
cialize in specific crimes. In this section, we will show that this pattern is robust to controlling for
9See for instance Dills et al. (2010) for a review of the empirical literature on the determinants of crime.
10When an action involves more than one province, controls are obtained as follows. GDP per capita is computed
as the sum of the GDP in the different provinces divided by the sum of the population in same provinces. Analo-
gously, Permitsjt is constructed as sum resident permits (for citizens coming from countries which feature a criminal
organization tracked by the DIA) divided by the sum of the population in the same provinces. Moreover, in 2009
three new provinces where created (Monza e Brianza, Fermo e Barletta-Andria-Trani). To ensure consistency of our
series, we attribute their post-2009 data to the corresponding pre-2009 province.
8
observed and unobserved characteristics of the areas where crimes are undertaken and action-specific
controls, and it varies between incumbent and non-incumbent regions. We estimate the probability
of cooperating using probit and logit models of the general form:
Pr[Cijt = 1] = Ω[β0 + β1Incr + β2Inpijt + β3Inpijt× Incr + β4∆ijt + β5Ξjt + ζr + ϕt] (2)
Cijt captures cooperation and it is equal to 1 if in taking the action i, the police arrests members
of an organization of Italians and foreigners, in province j, at time t. Ω is the cumulative normal
function when probit models are estimated and the cumulative logistic function when logit models are
estimated. Inpijt is a dummy taking value 1 if among the crimes that caught people are accused of
as consequence of action i, in province j at time t, there is at least one which is functional to provide
inputs. Incr indicates whether criminal activities have been undertaken in incumbent regions. ∆ijt
is a matrix of action-level controls, including the number of people reached by the police warrant
(
∑N
i=1 P
ijt ) and the number of crimes they are accused of (
∑N
i=1O
ijt). Ξjt is a matrix of time-varying
controls at the province level containing per-capita GDP in province j at time t (GDPjt), the ratio
of residence permits over the total province j ’s population at time t, as of December 31 of each year
(Permitsjt) and the population density in province j at time t (Densityjt). ζr and ϕt are regional
dummies and time fixed-effects, respectively. 11 Table 3.3 collects the results.
In columns (1) and (6) we report the estimates of probit and logit regressions where the only
regressor of interest is Incr. In columns (2) and (7) we add the variable Inpijt. In columns (4) and (9)
we interact Inpijt and Incr to capture how cooperation is associated to crimes that involve inputs
and are undertaken in incumbent regions. In each specification of Table 3.3, we include GDPjt,
Permitsjt, Density,
∑N
i=1 P
ijt,
∑N
i=1O
ijt and year fixed effects. In columns (3), (5), (8) and (10)
we also include regional dummies.12
Irrespective of specification and the methodology used, the estimated coefficients on Inpijt are
positive and strongly significant, confirming what emerges from Figure 3: cooperation is higher when
foreign organizations are likely to provide inputs more efficiently for the undertaken criminal activi-
ties. Moreover, the estimated coefficient for the variable Incr tend to be negative (and significant in
4 cases out of 6), indicating that cooperation is less likely to happen in incumbent regions.
11Regional dummies allow to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the region(s) where crimes are
allegedly committed. Year fixed effect, which control for constant within-periods characteristics of the geographical
areas where crimes are committed, are always included. Notice that in Italy, a province is equivalent to a NUTS3
region, i.e. an area whose population ranges from 150,000 and 800,000 inhabitants. Regions are generally equivalent to
NUTS2 regions, i.e. areas with a population between 800,000 and 3 millions of inhabitants. However, these thresholds
are used as guidelines for establishing the regions, but are not applied rigidly by the Eurostat, i.e. some NUTS2
regions have more than 3 millions of inhabitants.
12Notice that in all the other columns of Table 3.3 Incr is such that a region is either always or never an incumbent
one. Consequently, region dummies are not included.
Table 3.3: The Pro-Cooperation Effect of Inputs and Incumbents: Regression Results
Probit Logit
Cijt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Incr -0.040
∗∗ -0.033∗ -0.018 -0.047∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.023
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Inpijt 0.121
∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040) (0.017)
ME of Inpijt at Incr = 0 0.106
∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.035) (0.021) (0.034) (0.019)
ME of Inpijt at Incr = 1 0.356
∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.029) (0.072) (0.025)
GDPjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Permitsjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Densityjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1 P
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1O
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795
Pseudo R2 0.1436 0.1793 0.2399 0.1909 0.2533 0.1436 0.1717 0.2383 0.1851 0.2545
The table reports marginal effects of probit and logit regressions. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Incr is a dummy equal to 1 if crimes are allegedly undertaken in at least one of the incumbent regions. Inpijt
is a dummy taking value 1 if among the crimes that caught people are accused of as consequence of action i, in province j at time t,
there is at least one for which a foreign input is necessary.
∑N
i=1 P
ijt is the number of persons against whom the warrant was issued as
consequence of action i, in province j at time t.
∑N
i=1 O
ijt is the number of crimes these persons are accused of. GDPjt is the GDP
per-capita in province j at time t. Permitsjt is the ratio of residence permits over the total province j ’s population at time t, as
of December 31 of each year. Densityjt is the population density in province j at time t.
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Interestingly though, the interaction between Incr and Inpijt is always positive and significant,
suggesting a pro-cooperation effect of inputs in incumbent regions. The marginal effect (ME) of
Inpijt when Incr = 1, i.e. when crimes are committed in incumbent regions, is systematically larger
than the ME Inpijt when crimes are undertaken in non-incumbent regions (i.e., at Incr = 0).
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Although clearly pointing to a pro-cooperation effect of Incr× Inpijt, results could suffer from
the presence of reverse causality arising from the fact that while the nature of the crimes undertaken
could determine whether they are committed in cooperation, existing mixed organizations could
better placed to do some activities, leading cooperation to cause the kind of crime undertaken and
not the other way around.
We attempt to reduce this simultaneity by using a PSM approach (see Becker et al., 2002; Imbens
and Wooldridge, 2009). We first compute the propensity scores using a logit model where the
treatment is the interaction Incr× Inpijt (the scores are shown in Figure F2 and indicate that the
propensity tend to be higher for the treated than for the untreated). The sample is split in 5 blocks
to ensure that the balancing property is satisfied, i.e. that in each block the average propensity score
is not different for treated and untreated. We then estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
of being at the same time in an incumbent region and undertake crimes that involve inputs on the
probability of cooperating, using the interaction Incr× Inpijt as treatment and
∑N
i=1 P
ijt,
∑N
i=1 O
ijt,
GDPjt, Permitsij and Densityjt as covariates, always controlling for year fixed-effects and regional
dummies. We use three different techniques: Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM), Radius Matching
(RM), and Kernel Matching (KM). Results are reported in Table 3.4.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the ATEs on the the treated using NNM, RM, and KM. Columns
(4), (5), and (6) collect the ATEs obtained using the same methods while trimming units at the
5th centile: whatever the matching procedure used, the ATE on the treated is always positive and
strongly significant, confirming the results that emerged from the regression analysis. In other
words, undertaking criminal activities that involve a foreign input in an incumbent region increases
the probability of cooperation among domestic and foreign organizations. 14
In Section 5, we will also show that these results are in line with a model in which the strong
power of incumbent organization can result in violence forcing foreign criminals to cooperate with
local groups.
13To assess the robustness of our results, we have performed a series of additional estimations, focusing on alternative
definitions of our key regressors, Incr and Inpijt. The results of these checks, not reported here, are available upon
request. First, we have checked what happens to our results when we change the definition of Incr. In particular, we
have re-defined Incr as being equal to one for Campania only when the provinces of Caserta and Napoli are targeted
by an action, rather than any province in the region. This is because there is evidence (see e.g. Pinotti (2015)) that
crime intensity varies a lot across the five provinces of region. This is confirmed in our data where the latter is involved
in 356 actions. Of these, almost 90% took place in the provinces of Caserta and Napoli. Second, we have re-defined
the variable Inpijt in two more ways. In one case Inpijt equals 1 if the criminal activities are committed against
humans (Human Trafficking, Enslavement and Prostitution). In the other, Inpijt is equal to 1 when the same set of
inputs is not undertaken against humans (Cyber Crimes, Smuggling and Counterfeit). Our results hold in all these
cases.
14Notice that results are robust to changes in the radius in RM and to increasing the number of repetitions for the
computation of standard errors.
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Table 3.4: The Pro-Cooperation Effect of Inputs and Incumbents: PSM Results
Untrimmed Trimmed
Cijt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATENN 0.349∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.090)
ATER 0.333∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.141)
ATEK 0.328∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.080)
GDPjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Permitsjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Densityjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1 P
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1 O
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of treated 43 24 43 27 21 27
# of untreated 50 76 886 30 51 392
The table reports ATEs on the treated using NNM ((column(1) and (4)), RM ((column (2)
and (5), with a radius of 0.0001) and KM (column (3) and (6)). Columns (1)-(3) ((4)-(6))
collect untrimmed (trimmed) results. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Propensity scores are obtained on a common support for treated and untreated. Bootstrapped
standard obtained after 100 repetitions are in parentheses. In the NNM control units are not
forced to match 1:1, i.e. replacement is allowed. In column (4)-(6) observations are trimmed
at the 5th centile.
∑N
i=1 P
ijt is the number of persons against whom the warrant was issued
as consequence of action i, in province j at time t.
∑N
i=1 O
ijt is the number of crimes these
persons are accused of. GDPjt is the GDP per-capita in province j at time t. Permitsjt
is the ratio of residence permits over the total province j ’s population at time t, as of
December 31 of each year. Densityjt is the population density in province j at time t.
4.1 Cooperation Inside and Outside Headquarter Regions
In this section we further extend our empirical analysis by using a more fine-grained definition of
incumbency which will be captured by the dummies Incr,[HQ only] and Incr,[HQ and outside] defined in
Section 4.1.
As shown in Table 3.2 almost half of the actions target incumbent regions (45%). Of these around
75% target crimes undertaken incumbent regions only, while 25% involve alleged criminals in at least
two regions, of which one is incumbent. Importantly, as mentioned earlier, 83% of the actions taken by
the police in incumbent regions target traditional organization. By refining our incumbency measure
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we aim at exploiting this feature of the data to look at the behavior of traditional organizations when
criminal activities go beyond the headquarter territories. Results are collected in 3.5.
Table 3.5: Cooperation Inside and Outside Headquarter Regions
Probit Logit
Cijt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incr,[HQ] -0.068
∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020)
Incr,[HQ and outside] -0.003 0.014 -0.007 0.013
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Inpijt 0.227
∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.018) (0.041) (0.017)
ME of Inpijt at Incr,[HQ]=1 0.402
∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.031) (0.083) (0.027)
ME of Inpijt at Incr,[HQ and outside] = 1 0.392
∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.061) (0.151) (0.050)
GDPjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Permitsjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Densityjt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1 P
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes∑N
i=1O
ijt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,795
Pseudo R2 0.1517 0.1965 0.2540 0.1480 0.1920 0.2551
The table reports marginal effects of probit and logit regressions. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Incr is a dummy equal to 1 if crimes are allegedly
undertaken in at least one of the incumbent regions. Inputijt is a dummy taking value 1 if among the crimes
that caught people are accused of as consequence of action i, in province j at time t, there is at least one
for which a foreign input is necessary. (Incr,[HQ and outside]) Incr,[HQ only] equals 1 if crimes are allegedly
undertaken (not) exclusively in an incumbent region.
∑N
i=1 P
ijt is the number of persons against whom the
warrant was issued as consequence of action i, in province j at time t.
∑N
i=1 O
ijt is the number of crimes
these persons are accused of. GDPjt is the GDP per-capita in province j at time t. Permitsjt is the ratio
of residence permits over the total province j ’s population at time t, as of December 31 of each year.
Densityjt is the population density in province j at time t.
The ME on Incr,[HQ only] is always negative and significant. The one on Incr,[HQ and outside] is
instead never different from zero: cooperation is less likely when criminal activities are undertaken
only in incumbent regions. In line with the results discussed previously, Inpijt is always positive and
significant, indicating that organizations are more likely to cooperate for specific crimes. Interestingly,
the MEs of Inpijt at Incr,[HQ]=1 and at Incr,[HQ and outside] = 1 are always positive and significant
showing that the type of crime committed is a key driver of cooperation. Importantly, the ME
is higher when crimes are take place in incumbent regions, confirming that undertaking criminal
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activities that involve a foreign input in an incumbent region increases the probability of cooperation
among domestic and foreign organizations.
5 Model
In this section we construct a simple theoretical model to make sense of our empirical findings. The
model uses a standard solution concept from coalitional game theory, the Nash bargaining solution
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The choice of a model allowing us to abstract from procedural details is
dictated by scarce existing knowledge, even anecdotal, on the process by which criminal organizations
approach each other and negotiate their dealings.
In the model the decision to cooperate is motivated by the payoffs obtainable with or without
cooperating. We treat criminal groups as if they were legal enterprises, whose sole concern is profit
maximization. We identify assumptions on payoffs necessary for theoretical results to match those
from our empirical analysis. We discuss these assumptions in relation to the need for Domestic
groups to control the territory close to their headquarters.
5.1 A Coalitional Model of Mafia Cooperation
We assume that a criminal operation stems from a business opportunity, from which benefits can
be extracted to different extents by different groups. Illicit business opportunities have several
characteristics represented by a realization θ of a random vector Θ. The value υ which can be
extracted from an opportunity does not only depend on the vector θ but also on the group g operating
it. We consider three possibilities. A Domestic Group (g = D), a Foreign Group (g = F ), or a mixed
one (g = C). Cooperation will be efficient if
υC(θ) > υD(θ) + υF (θ) (3)
We can also think of the latter two values as the outside options of organizations which do not
cooperate. An organization will want to cooperate if the share it receives of the joint venture profits
is larger than its outside option. α is the share of the Domestic group, and (1− α) is the share of
the Foreign Group. Cooperation will happen if it is Incentive Compatible for both parties:
αυC(θ) > υD(θ) (4)
(1− α) υC(θ) > υF (θ) (5)
Assuming surplus is shared through Nash Bargaining, we have that
αυC(y) =
1
2
υC(θ) +
υD(θ)− υF (θ)
2
(1− α) υC(θ) = 1
2
υC(θ) +
υF (θ)− υD(θ)
2
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With the resulting division of surplus, the conditions for Domestic and Foreign organizations to
cooperate (4 and 5) boil down to 3, which suggest that cooperation will happen whenever it is
efficient: The probability of observing a cooperation is then the probability of Θ taking values
such that 3 is satisfied. The probability of observing cooperation is an increasing function of the
difference vC − (υF + υD), and, through these three addends, of the operation characteristics θ.
We will now specifically look at the two main variables from our estimated model. We are going
to make assumptions on how payoffs are influenced by the opportunity involving operations in an
“incumbent” province (Incumbentijt = 1, Inc hereafter) and by the presence of a foreign input
(Inputijt = 1, Inp hereafter). Since Θ includes Inc and Inp with all remaining characteristics, we
will denote the remaining components with Γ, so that Θ = (Γ, Inc, Inp)
We first make two simplifying assumptions. First, that the way other characteristics affect the
value of the operation is not influenced by the value of Inc and Inp. The second one is that these two
inputs affect the value in case of Cooperation, less than they do for stand-alone organizations. This
seems natural as in a Cooperation all the “best” options are available (eg: political cover supplied
by Italians, prostitutes supplied by foreigners), so that the effect of Inc and Inp on value should be
weaker for a Cooperation group than it is for stand-alone groups.
Assumption 1. ∀ g, γ, γ’ , Inc, Inc’, Inp, Inp’
υg (Inc, Inp, γ)− υg (Inc, Inp, γ′) = υg (Inc, Inp′, γ)− υg (Inc′, Inp′, γ′)
Assumption 2. ∀ g, γ, γ’ , Inc, Inc’, Inp, Inp’
|υC (Inc, Inp, γ)− υC (Inc′, Inp′, γ) | <
| [υD (Inc, Inp, γ)− υD (Inc′, Inp′, γ)] + [υF (Inc, Inp, γ)− υF (Inc′, Inp′, γ)] |15
Lemma 1. The probability of cooperation is a decreasing function of υF + υD
We will assume that Inc (Inp) being equal to one implies a disadvantage for a Foreign (Do-
mestic) group versus a Domestic (Foreign) one, and hence a bargaining advantage for a Domestic
organization. The idea is that an Italian organization would not be able to efficiently source the
foreign inputs characterizing crimes for which Inp = 1, and a foreign organization would be unable
to operate efficiently in a province home to a “traditional” Domestic organization (Inc = 1) .
Assumption 3. ∀ g, γ, γ’ , Inc, Inc’, Inp, Inp’
υD (Inc, 1)− υD (Inc′, 0) < 0
υF (1, Inp)− υF (0, Inp′) < 0
It seems natural to assume, that ceteris paribus, Inc and Inp also constitute direct advantages
for F and D respectively.
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Assumption 4. ∀ Inc, Inp
υF (Inc, 1)− υF (Inc, 0) > 0
υD (1, Inp)− υD (0, Inp) > 0
Note that Assumption 3 is stronger than Assumption 4, as we are not requiring the value of the
other variable (Inc when we consider a Domestic group, Inp when we consider a Foreign group) to
be the same for the inequality to hold.
5.2 Results
Assumptions 3 and 4 combined imply that
υD (0, 0) > υD (1, 1)
υF (0, 0) > υF (1, 1)
and hence
υD (0, 0) + υF (0, 0) > υD (1, 1) + υF (1, 1)
By Lemma 1, this allows to conclude that
υC (0, 0)− υF (0, 0)− υD (0, 0) < υC (1, 1)− υF (1, 1)− υD (1, 1)
As one would expect, gains from cooperation are higher when both specialized inputs are involved.
This allows us to conclude that
Proposition 1. The probability of cooperation is higher when the operation involves a foreign input
and an incumbent province, than it is in a comparable operation in which neither appears.
P (C|Inc = 1, Inp = 1,Γ = γ) > P (C|Inc = 0, Inp = 0,Γ = γ)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, only a very basic and natural set of assumptions is needed for the prob-
ability of cooperation to be higher when both parties need what the other brings to the table. This
result is reflected in the predicted probability of our probit and logit models16 and in our PSM
analysis.
We are now going to discuss which other conditions on payoffs are needed to match the most
significant statistical findings from our empirical analysis, namely
1. The positive effect of “Inp” on cooperation.
2. The sizable difference between the effect of “Inp” on cooperation inside and outside incumbent
provinces (Inc = 0)
16In all the specifications of Table 3.3, conditional predicted probabilities satisfy the ranking of Proposition 1.
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5.2.1 The Positive Effect of Input
For this model’s solution to show cooperation will be higher in presence of a foreign input, we need
to show that
υC (Inc, 0)− υF (Inc, 0)− υD (Inc, 0) < υC (Inc, 1)− υF (Inc, 1)− υD (Inc, 1)
By Lemma 1, it is enough that
υD (Inc, 0)− υD (Inc, 1) > υF (Inc, 1)− υF (Inc, 0) (6)
Condition 6 amounts to assuming that, the losses for a Domestic organization from using a foreign
input when operating alone are larger than the gains a Foreign organization obtains when involved
in an operation with a foreign input. Since a Domestic organization may simply lack the connections
necessary to supply some inputs, the assumption does not appear controversial.
Proposition 2. If 6 holds, the probability of cooperation is higher when a foreign input is present
P (C|Inc = 1, Inp = i,Γ = γ) > P (C|Inc = 0, Inp = i,Γ = γ),∀i ∈ {0, 1}
5.2.2 The Different Effect of Input Inside and Outside Incumbent Regions.
Our empirical model (in line with the empirical distribution of our sample), not only predicts that
the probability of cooperation when a foreign input is present will be higher in incumbent provinces
than outside, but in particular that the difference due to the presence of a foreign input will be larger
in an incumbent region
P (C|Inc = 1, Inp = 1,Γ = γ)− P (C|Inc = 1, Inp = 0,Γ = γ) >
P (C|Inc = 0, Inp = 1,Γ = γ)− P (C|Inc = 0, Inp = 0,Γ = γ)
This is going to be the case if and only if
υF (1, 1) + υD (1, 1)− υF (1, 0)− υD (1, 0) < υF (0, 1) + υD (0, 1)− υF (0, 0)− υD (0, 0)
It is useful to rewrite the previous condition in terms of the effect of Inp on the sum of stand-alone
payoffs when Inc is equal to 1 or 0.
[υD (1, 1)− υD (1, 0)] + [υF (1, 1)− υF (1, 0)] < [υD (0, 1)− υD (0, 0)] + [υF (0, 1)− υF (0, 0)] (7)
While both sides of the inequality are smaller than zero by condition 6, determining the sign of
the inequality requires some combination of the following:
• The positive effect of Inp on the profits of a Foreign group is smaller in Incumbent regions.
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• The negative effect of Inp on the profits of a Domestic group is larger in Incumbent regions.
Institutional knowledge -corroborated by our data- suggests that the first effect is dominant,
because of the possibility of violent conflict between Domestic and Foreign groups in Incumbent
regions usually resolves in sizable losses for the latter (see for example the “Castel Volturno Massacre”
of September 2008 or the “Pescopagano Massacre” of April 1990).
Besides anecdotal evidence, our data shows that violence is more prevalent in Incumbent regions
(more than two thirds of the total murder warrants in our data pertain to operations involving Incum-
bent regions. Furthermore while Foreign groups constitute 27.89% of operations outside Incumbent
regions, the fraction dramatically drops to 2.74% in Incumbent regions, suggesting that stand-alone
operations are either unprofitable or unfeasible in incumbent regions, making cooperation more de-
sirable to Foreign criminals.
These considerations suggest that a Foreign group has to discount profits obtained in Incumbent
regions by the probability of surviving a violent conflict, hence dampening the effect of any other
variable (including Input), resulting in the second addend of the left hand side ([υF (1, 1)− υF (1, 0)])
becoming smaller and 7 being verified.
6 Conclusions
This paper exploits a novel data set to study for the first time the interplay among Italian and foreign
criminal organizations in the Italian territory. In doing that, we start from the idea the criminal
associations share traits with corporations. Several results emerge.
First, cooperation is more concentrated in criminal activities for which foreign groups could be
well equipped to provide inputs (e.g. counterfeiting activities or enslavement practices). Second,
even if in general cooperation is negatively associated with the presence of incumbent organizations
in some regions (i.e. Sicilia, Campania, and Calabria), the probability of cooperating in the same
regions is higher for crimes where complementarities among domestic and foreign organizations could
make cooperation more convenient. In fact, the different results we obtain for incumbent and non-
incumbent regions suggest that “market conditions” play a role in determining which crimes are
undertaken in cooperation. One potential explanation could be that in regions where incumbents
are strong, the threat of violence might force foreigners to cooperate in criminal activities they could
normally engage in without a local partner.
Our findings are consistent with a simple model where cooperation is not only driven by an
economic motive, but also by the threat of violence involved in criminal activities.
Our paper should be considered as a first step toward a better understanding of how different
(heterogenous) criminal organizations come together to perform single or multiple tasks. It could be
that not only firms but also criminal organizations are shifting to a more “horizontal” organizational
model as opposed to a more classic hierarchical one.
7 Appendix
Figure F1: Example of Police Action
relazione DEL MINISTRO DELL’INTERNO AL PARLAMENTO 
SULL’ATTIVITÀ SVOLTA E I RISULTATI CONSEGUITI DALLA 
direzione investigativa antimafia - 1° SEMESTRE 2009
72 )
Il forte carattere della pressione	estorsiva dei sodalizi risulta acclarato, oltre da 
quanto in precedenza evidenziato, anche dalle numerose ed importanti operazioni 
di polizia, concluse nei confronti delle componenti criminali operanti in questo set-
tore dell’illecito. 
In merito:
 - in data 21 gennaio 2009, i Carabinieri del Nucleo Investigativo di Monreale, nel 
territorio di Partinico (PA) e Borgetto (PA), nell’ambito dell’operazione “Char-
tago”, hanno eseguito ordinanze di custodia cautelare95 nei confronti di quindici 
soggetti appartenenti all’associazione criminale cosa nostra, in quanto ritenuti 
responsabili di estorsione nei confronti di vari imprenditori di Palermo;
 - in data 27 febbraio 2009, i Carabinieri del Comando Provinciale di Palermo, nel-
l’ambito dell’operazione “Senza Frontiere” hanno eseguito 12 ordinanze di cu-
stodia cautelare in carcere96 nei confronti di altrettanti vertici ed affiliati a cosa 
nostra, sodali alla famiglia mafiosa di VILLABATE, ritenuti responsabili dei reati 
di associazione di tipo mafioso finalizzata alle estorsioni ed all’intestazione fitti-
zia di beni; 
 - in data 4 aprile 2009, personale del Nucleo Investigativo dei Carabinieri di Agri-
gento traeva in arresto97 un pregiudicato, che si era reso responsabile, unitamen-
te ad altri due soggetti, del reato di estorsione commessa al fine di agevolare 
l’attività dell’associazione mafiosa denominata cosa nostra. 
Il predetto, nel periodo compreso tra l’agosto 2001 e il marzo 2003 aveva com-
piuto atti intimidatori diretti ad estorcere ingenti somme di denaro ad un impren-
ditore, titolare di ditta aggiudicataria di gara d’appalto nel Comune di Burgio 
(AG); 
 - in data 17 marzo 2009, a Termini	 Imerese, Trabia e Sciara, i Carabinieri del 
Gruppo di Monreale, nell’ambito dell’operazione “Camaleonte 2”, hanno eseguito 
15 ordinanze di custodia cautelare in carcere98 nei confronti di altrettanti soggetti 
ritenuti responsabili di associazione di tipo mafioso ed estorsione. Le investiga-
zioni, svolte con articolate metodiche tecniche, hanno permesso di ricostruire la 
struttura e le dinamiche evolutive del mandamento mafioso di TRABIA; 
 - in data 11 maggio 2009, la Squadra Mobile di Palermo, nell’ambito dell’opera-
zione “Cerbero”, ha eseguito 37 ordinanze di custodia cautelare99 nei confronti 
di altrettanti soggetti appartenenti ai mandamenti di BRANCACCIO e PORTA 
NUOVA, con l’accusa di estorsione; 
 - in data 20 aprile 2009, i Carabinieri eseguivano ordinanza di custodia caute-
lare100, nei confronti di 37 persone, ritenute responsabili, a vario titolo, di as-
95 O.C.C.C. nr. 10708/08 RG DDA e nr. 9096/08 RG GIP, emessa dal GIP presso il Tribunale di Palermo.
96	 O.C.C.C. nr. 17457/08 RGDDA e nr. 12638/08 RGGIP, emessa dal GIP presso il Tribunale di Palermo.
97 O.C.C.C. nr. 17163/08 RGNR e nr. 12617/2008 RGGIP, emessa dal GIP presso il Tribunale di Palermo.
98 O.C.C.C. nr. 2470/05 RG DDA e nr. 3578/08 RGGIP, emessa dal GIP presso il Tribunale di Palermo.
99 O.C.C.C. nr. 6973/09 DDA e nr. 5391/09 RGGIP, emessa dal GIP presso il Tribunale di Palermo.
100	O.C.C.C. nr. 3348/06 RGNR, nr. 2706/07 RGGIP e nr. 281/09 ROCC, emessa dal GlP presso il Tribunale di Catania.
Source: Extract from the 2009 DIA report, second semester.
Table A1: Criminal Activities: Summary Statistics
Activity Observations % Definition
Drugs 802 43.10 Drug-related crimes and includes both trafficking and pushing.
Extortion 462 24.83 Cases in which alleged criminals were accused of having forced somebody,
through violence or threat, to do or omit something with objective obtaining
unfair profits.
Mafia-type Association 443 23.80 Participants of a criminal association use the intimidating power of the mem-
bership and exploit the situation of subjugation and “omerta`” in order to
manage or control, directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, au-
thorizations, public contracts or to generate undue profits or advantages for
himself or others (art. 416-bis of the Penal Code, law 646/82).
Conspiracy 318 17.09 Groups made of three of more people stably involved in some criminal activity
(art. 416 of the Penal Code).
Weapons 267 14.35 Trafficking and the possession of weapons.
Murder 160 8.60 Cases of killing.
Prostitution 115 6.18 Prostitution-related crimes.
Usury 99 5.32 The practice of lending money at excessive interest rates.
Robbery 81 4.35 Theft activities.
Human Trafficking 77 4.14 The trade of humans (e.g. for the purpose of sexual slavery or forced labor).
Money Laundering 78 4.19 The process by which criminals disguise the original ownership and control of
the proceeds of criminal activities by making such proceeds appear to have
derived from a legitimate source (e.g. investing profits deriving from drug-
trafficking activities into catering or construction industries).
Fraud 69 3.73 Deliberate deception to secure unfair or unlawful gain.
Cyber Crimes 22 1.18 Offences that are committed against individuals or groups of individuals with
a criminal motive to intentionally cause physical or mental harm, or loss, to
the victim directly or indirectly, using modern telecommunication networks.
Enslavement 35 1.88 The act of making people slaves.
Unfair Competition 29 1.56 The illegal behavior aimed at harming competitors.
Counterfeit 24 1.30 Activities intended to illegally produce and market products identical to others
protected by trademarks, patents or copyrights.
Bid Rigging 15 0.81 Illegal conspiracies in which competitors join to artificially increase the prices
of goods and/or services offered in bids to potential customers or to carve up
the potential business between the conspirators.
Arson 16 0.86 The crime of intentionally and maliciously setting fire to properties with the
intent to cause damage.
Smuggling 15 0.81 The illegal transportation of objects in violation of applicable laws.
Source: DIA reports. Crime categories are non-mutually exclusive.
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Figure F2: Propensity Scores
Note: Untreated (Treated) actions are those for which the interaction Incr× Inpijt is equal to 0 (1). Propensity score are computed on a
common support for treated and untreated. The figure shows log of the logit odds of propensity scores.
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